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PRESENT:

MARY SUE HAFNER

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First of all, I would like to Ms. Hafner. welcome everyone to this briefing this afternoon. My name is Mary Sue Hafner and I am Deputy Director and General Counsel of the Helsinki Commission.

We are here today to hear from a delegation from the International Human Rights Law Group who have just returned from Turkey for a four day visit where they have been looking into the Turkish Parliament's action in stripping seven parliamentarians of their immunity stemming from their exercise of free speech. They also looked into the arrest, detention and the impending prosecution of six of those parliamentarians on charges that carry the death penalty. Finally, the delegation looked into the court proceedings aimed at dissolving the Kurdish-based Democratic Party, also known as DEP.

The Commission is an independent government 1976 which created in to monitor agency was implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. from the House ofcomprised \mathbf{of} nine members

Representatives and nine members from the Senate. We also have three Executive Branch officials appointed by the President.

The Commission's concerns with Turkey date back well over 13, 14 years. In 1982, the Commission issued its first staff report on Turkey, at a time when the military had taken over about two years previously. The Commission found that there were drastic and dramatic improvements needed in the human rights picture. That was followed about five years later when the Commission's co-chairman, Representative Hoyer, visited Ankara with the North Atlantic Assembly. He used that occasion to meet with Turkish government officials as well as members of the Kurdish group, human rights activists and other political activists.

Following his visit, the Commission issued its second staff report which was approximately 1989. The Commission took note of the marked improvement in the human rights situation in Turkey.

About a year or two years later, Senator Dennis DeConcini, the Commission's chairman, led the first official delegation to Turkey. At that time, he

was able to visit, go into several Turkish prisons and
meet with political activists whom we called political
prisoners. His visit was subsequently followed by a
report by the Chairman and Senator Dennis DeConcini made
note of the very serious human rights problems that were
persisting in Turkey.

Over the past couple of years, we have held numerous briefings as well as these types of hearings on the human rights violations that continue to occur in Turkey. Today's briefing is basically a reflection of the Commission's continuing concern over the human rights picture, one which we view as deteriorating seriously.

I am very pleased to welcome two of the delegates who were on the law group. First I will introduce Ambassador David Korn. He is a Middle East expert. He served 31 years in the Department of State and was also Ambassador to Togo from 1986 to 1988. He has authored several books on human rights, international law on the Kurds and the politics of the Middle East as well as Africa.

The delegation was led by Mr. Steven

Schneebaum, an attorney and partner at Patton, Boggs and Blow. He is a member of the Executive Committee, the Law Group's Board of Directors. From 1976 to 1978 he also served in the General Counsel's office at USIA.

The Commission is very pleased to welcome you here this afternoon.

First I would like to introduce Janelle
Diller, who is the legal director of the Law Group. I
think she has perhaps a few opening remarks.

Ms. Diller. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.

The Law Group deeply appreciates the gracious hosting of this forum by the Commission and we also want to thank the law firm of Patton, Boggs and Blow, of which our Executive Committee member Steve Schneebaum is a partner, for helping to prepare the delegation for its mission, including the preparation of this briefing book, as well as assisting the Commission here in preparing for this briefing.

We at the Law Group are gravely concerned at our findings in investigating the prosecution of the members of Parliament in Turkey and the proceedings to

ban the Kurdish-based Democracy Party, called the DEP.

We believe the situation in Turkey, including these
cases we have investigated, calls for a full hearing in
this Congress on Turkey's treatment of the Kurds in its
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We embarked on this mission at the request of international concerned Turks, Kurds and governmental colleagues. We received the support of this Commission and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Despite even this support, the Turkish government refused our request to meet with the detained DEP deputies. The government did, however, facilitate our meetings with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the chief prosecutor in the cases involving the Kurdish deputies.

Our team also met with Chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Human Rights Committees, the only deputy released pending trial, Islamic politician, and lawyers for the Kurdish deputies.

Our over arching aim as an organization is to

encourage the incorporation of international human rights standards into national laws. This goal is nowhere more critically needed than in the situation that's the subject of our mission and discussion today. We have worked toward this end in more than 80 countries around the globe. We seek to empower locally based advocates to promote human rights through strengthening the rule of law in their own countries. We do this by providing on-site training in human rights advocacy and legal reform. As a lawyer's group, we also observe trials to monitor the degree to which judicial processes conform to international standards. For example, we have recently observed the

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For example, we have recently observed the Paul Hill trial in Ireland and the trial of fundamentalists in Tunisia. We would like to observe also the trials of the DEP deputies, should those trials take place, and that of the Islamic deputy in Turkey as well.

I welcome your interest in this subject and now turn to Steve to begin our presentation.

Mr. Schneebaum. Well, thanks, Janelle.

Thanks also to the Commission for hosting this

event which provides us with an opportunity to think out in public what we perceived while we were in Turkey and what we propose to conclude now that we are back.

The delegation was in Turkey for four days. As Janelle mentioned, we are a legal organization, that is an organization of volunteers, lawyers, who volunteer their time, although some of our friends, like Ambassador Korn, are not lawyers. We allow them to join with us from time to time and make their contributions. We are a legal organization and our focus is on the implementation of international human rights law as law, and the adherence of countries around the globe, including the United States, to the standards to which they are committed as a matter of both customary and conventional international law.

Specifically, what concerned us in Turkey were two proposed or pending judicial actions. One is the prosecution of the seven parliamentarians, six of them under Section 125 of the penal code, to which I will return later, and the seventh under a different section of the code, and also the prospective dissolution of the Democracy Party, the essentially Kurdish-based party

which now has, counting the detained deputies, 13 members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

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We conclude that both of those actions, that is the prosecutions of the parliamentarians and the prospective dissolution of the party, constitute derogations, violations of Turkey's international legal obligations under both customary and conventional international law. But again, more of that later.

Before getting into the details of the report, I do want to mention a couple of things that ought not to get lost in the rush to find a conclusion here. is that we were extended extraordinary courtesies by the Turkish government, with the exception of our inability to visit the detainees, and we were not permitted to see We were able to talk with just about anybody we them. wanted, from the Deputy Under Secretary level at various ministries through members of Parliament, lawyers on both sides of the matter, both the state prosecutor and the defense lawyers. We were able to talk with the Islamic deputy, Mr. Mezarci, who is not in prison, and we owe a debt of thanks to the government in general and to the Embassy here in Washington in particular for

making those visits and those opportunities available to us.

The second point worth noting at the outset is that in Turkey our perception was that political debate takes place very openly. At least in Ankara it does. It was routine for people who visited us, people including several with strongly anti-government views, who visited us and would have conversations with us in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in the full view of the public and anybody who walked by, to express themselves loudly, vehemently even, about their views of what the government was up to in this case and in other cases. It was encouraging to me to see the willingness with which people expressed dissident political views with absolutely no apparent fear of reprisal or retaliation.

Now, that is the good news and it is good news. It is not a matter of insignificance that at least the English language, Turkish Daily, the Turkish Daily News, described the arrest and prosecution of the Parliamentarians as a trampling on justice. We conclude that they were right in so doing, but the important thing to note is that they did it. They did it openly

and they did it, again, without fear of reprisal.

Now, with that as background, there is, of course, no general right of Parliamentary immunity and international law. Indeed, people who live and work in this building know that perhaps better than anyone. The United States does not have a system of parliamentary immunity, for example, except with respect to speech and debate in the Congress itself, as that might be broadly interpreted by the courts. By a congressman who violates the law in his or her private capacity or outside of the city of Washington, not acting as a member of Congress, is subject to prosecution and nobody thinks that there's anything abusive about that.

The problem here, the problem in Turkey is not the fact that the prospective defendants in these actions are members of Parliament. The problem is that the acts of which they stand accused are entirely speech acts, they are not physical acts. The statute under which all by Mr. Mezarci, the Islamic fundamentalists, the statute under which all of them are being prosecuted is the following, and I'll read it in full. "Whoever commits an act intended to put the entire or a part of

the territory of the state under the sovereignty of a foreign state or to decrease the independence or to disrupt the union of the state or to separate a part of its territory from the administration of the state shall be punished by penalty of death."

Now, that is Article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code. It emphasizes acts, whoever commits an act. Not whoever makes a speech or whoever makes a promise to voters, but whoever commits an act. The position of the public prosecutor is, as one would expect, that a threatening speech is an act, that incitement to violence is violence and so on. Irrespective of how one feels about those propositions in the abstract, one need only consider that standard against the actual words spoken by these members of Parliament to see that what is being proposed to be punished here is not action, but words. Indeed, words that specifically espouse the constitutional systems, words specifically intended to give rise to constitutional peaceful, legal challenges to the existing power structure in Turkey.

For example, one of the allegations against the members of Parliament is that several of them, upon

completing a demographic questionnaire when they were sworn into Parliament, a demographic questionnaire that asked where did you go to school and how many brothers and sisters you have. One of the questions that the questionnaire put to the new members of Parliament was what foreign languages do you speak. Several of the Kurdish MPs said Turkish. That is cited, in all seriousness, as an illustration, as an example, as a count in the charge of separatism.

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Now, we submit and we conclude based on the investigation we performed in Turkey as well as the legal analysis that we've carried out both before and since that even if it is consistent with governing norms of customary and conventional international law to punish acts that would support, would tend to support the separatism of the Kurdish region of Turkey from the central administration. It is not consistent with Turkey's commitments, legal commitment to forbid that kind of speech. The specific norms of which this is, we conclude, a violation are set out in our statement.

There are several provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which we allege are violated

by this: Article 9 concerning arbitrary arrest; Article freedom of expression; 19 concerning Article 20 governing freedom of association: and Article 21 concerning the right to participate in government. Article 21, we would point out, is violated by the proposed action not only in that the individual members threatened with Parliament are removal from participation in the government process, but those who elected them to office are threatened with disenfranchisement because their elected MPs will no longer be representing them on the floor of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara.

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The Universal Declaration, as everyone knows, is not a treaty. It is, however, almost without exception considered to be a binding interpretation of the Human Rights Provisions, Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. Turkey, of course, has been a member of the United Nations since its inception.

Now, the European Convention of Human Rights is a treaty and it is a treaty specifically binding on Turkey. In large measure, the European convention on Human Rights incorporates in some cases verbatim the

provisions of the Universal Declaration. So, we allege that there are similar violations of the European Convention, Article 53 with respect to the presentation of prisons to judicial authorities; Article 10 regarding freedom of expression, which is the same as Article 19; Article 11 on freedom of association; and Article 14 which specially protects national minorities within the state's parties to the European Convention.

The European Convention on Human Rights is, as I mentioned, a treaty binding on Turkey and under the Turkish Constitution, Article 90, a treaty which is formally adopted by the Grand National Assembly is Turkish law for all purposes, prevailing even over the Constitution. That is, the courts may not entertain an action to the end of suggesting that a treaty is inconsistent with the constitution itself.

Now, one of the key issues that we investigated was exactly what are these MPs accused of. If need there were evidence suggesting that they were ordering massacres or throwing hand grenades or even inciting others to do those things, then conceivably our conclusions could be subject to rethinking. So, we

wanted to be very clear that we were talking about speech and nothing else. When I say speech, I don't mean to include incitement to riot. I mean we were talking about political speech.

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So. we probed everyone we spoke including the prosecutor, to tell us what kinds of allegations you have. We discovered that there is an interesting wrinkle in Turkish statutory law that reinforces our conclusion that we are, in fact, talking only about speech crimes and that's this. In order to be prosecuted, these members of Parliament had to have their parliamentary immunity lifted. Now, as I said earlier, there is no international law right to Parliamentary immunity. However, in Turkey there is a constitutional right, a statutory right, a domestic law right to parliamentary immunity. The parliamentary immunity was stripped. However, it was stripped from these deputies based on a specific charging document that was submitted by the state prosecutor to first the Justice Department, ultimately to the Grand National Assembly, "These are the charges," he said, "Members of Parliament, these are the charges for which I want these

people to have to stand trial." Those charges are strictly limited to speech act. Those charges include, as I mentioned, saying that one speaks Turkish as a foreign language or wearing green and yellow which are said to be the colors of the PKK terrorist organization, to the swearing-in ceremony before Parliament, things like that.

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Those charges then do not include the allegations that we heard regularly in Ankara from apologists for the government's position. regularly that everybody knows what's really going on here, everybody knows that these people are not on trial for such and such a speech given on such and such a day in such and such a place. They are on trial for inciting a terrorist organization to massacre innocent Turks in the Southeast of Turkey. That, if proved, would be a very serious charge indeed. Obviously it However, the lifting of immunity does not would. include those kinds of things. The evidence cited before the Parliament does not include those kinds of things, it includes only a list of specific speeches given at specific times with specific words included in

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we investigated then the question Now, whether, well, as in the United States, if you indict someone for a crime, there is nothing stopping the prosecution after the indictment from going out and getting additional evidence which supports the charge and can further embellish the prosecution's theory of the case. But what we're dealing with here is rather clearly not a matter of embellishing an existing theory. The prosecution tells us that they have evidence, for example, that the MPs directly incited PKK terrorists to massacre people in a certain village. We were not able to find out the name, we were not able to find out the date, we were not able to find out even which MPs were alleged to have done those things. But those charges, we conclude, as a matter of Turkish law, are not capable of presentation to the state security court at this time because they were not within the lifting of immunity that made it possible to prosecute these MPs in the first place.

The case with respect to the DEP, the Democracy Party, is similar. That is with respect to

the DEP, the allegations are again that speeches were made, in this case not even speeches made by these members by Parliament, but speeches made by the Chairman of the Party, who is not a member and who is not a defendant. Those speeches include exhortation to a political point of view. It may be a political point of view which is abhorrent in Ankara. It may be a political point of view with which few people agree, but that isn't the point. It is a political point of view expressed peacefully with the hope and open intent that people would act peacefully to bring about a political objective. We submit that as long as Turkey is bound by customary international law, as long as Turkey is a party to such conventions as the European Convention and Helsinki Final that that kind of the Act, criminalization of political views is inconsistent with Turkey's commitments to the international community as a matter of law and one cannot help but add inconsistent with Turkey's commitment to democracy as a matter of policy.

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Now, in saying that, I conclude with the point that here in the United States we may sometimes lose

site of the importance of, and that is this, that there is a spate of serious, dangerous violence that is going on in Southeastern Turkey and there are terrorist bands that are acting in Southeastern Turkey and whose acts are not acceptable to the international community in general and to anybody who cares about human rights law Now, it has been suggested, it was in particular. suggested to us in Turkey, that the government authorities might be more willing to entertain such views as ours if those who express those views make it clearer that we do not accept, tolerate, welcome, sponsor, in any way accept the existence of the kind of terrorist activity that has been happening in the Southeast of Turkey. Without getting into who is responsible for what particular act, which was far outside our mandate, the International Human Rights Law Group has absolutely no hesitation in saying that terror is prohibited as a means of achieving political objectives on the part of all, not just governments but insurgent groups, just insurgent notgroups but governments, by all. In particular. it is not acceptable when coming from the PKK.

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So, our espousal of the view that the prosecutions and the prospective dissolution of the party are inconsistent with international law should not by any one under any circumstances be read as being an endorsement or an acceptance of terrorist organizations that happen to take the same view with respect to the Kurdish deputies that we do.

That is the essence of our report, and based on that report we urge the Turkish government, of course, to abandon this effort to provide legal cover to what is essentially a political objective, that is the illegalization of a point of view. We urge that if this trial goes forward, it must take place in public. The trial will occur before a state security court, a hold-over from the days of military government in Turkey. It is a court which is permitted to conduct its proceedings in secret. That must not be permitted to happen here. The stakes are too high. What's more, there must be international observation of the trial of the DEP deputies if the trial goes forward.

We further urge the government of Turkey to abandon its effort to dissolve, to use the Turkish term,

to dissolve or to illegalize the Democracy Party which again, whether its views are agreeable or not agreeable, is a constitutional vehicle for expressing certain points of view. We urge that that be abandoned and we urge that all friends of Turkey, and the United States of course is a principal friend of Turkey, that all friends of Turkey across the world unite in the view that this kind of behavior is beneath the expectations that we rightfully have of Turkey's conduct and that Turkey will shortly return to a rule of law and to adherence to international human rights norms. Ms. Hafner. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Korn?

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Ambassador Korn. Thank you.

After spending four days together with two lawyers, I feel I have the right to recognition as an apprentice lawyer, but I won't exercise that right. I'll stick to other things.

I'd like to just go over briefly the background against which the lifting of immunity occurred and their arrest. It's a troubled one. Kurdish insurgency in the Southeast, led by the PKK that

has stubbornly continued to grow despite intensive efforts by the Turkish Army and security services. Every year in the spring, we were told, General Gures announces that this year will be the end of the PKK insurgency and every year it has gone on. So, there's a great deal of frustration in official circles and public circles.

An economic crisis that is reflected in an inflation rate that this year has hit 125 percent, a wave of bank failures and bankruptcies and growing unemployment. In the five days that our delegation was in Ankara, the Turkish lira lost over ten percent against the dollar.

A growing Islamic fundamentalist movement which, though still clearly a minority, does pose a potential threat to secular Turkish democracy. In the March 27 municipal elections, the Welfare, that is Islamic Party, swept the Southeastern region of Turkey and came into power in Ankara and in Islambul. It's a majority boosted evidently by a very strong Kurdish vote.

Finally, a widespread public loss of

confidence that one could see expressed in the newspapers everyday during the time we were there in Prime Minister Ciller and her government and a general expectation that the government will fall within the next few months and possibly be replaced by more a conservative government.

Now, I'd like to look briefly at the events that led up to the lifting of immunity of the deputies on March 2 and their arrest. On February 12, a bomb was placed in a suburban Istanbul railway station, the railway station that served the Turkish Military Academy. Five Turkish Military Academy cadets were killed and several more were wounded. The bombing was attributed to the PKK, an active urban terrorism.

On February 17, a Democracy Party deputy made public comments to the effect that the bombing was a type of act inevitable so long as the war in the southeast continues.

On February 18, in apparent retaliation for the February 12 bombing, the Ankara headquarters of the Democracy Party was bombed. One person was killed, another was injured. A group called the Turkish Revenge

Organization, alleged to be connected with one of the Turkish government security services, claimed credit for the bombing.

On February 25, the Democracy Party announced that it would boycott the March 27 municipal elections. It declared that 325 of its candidates had been arrested and 19 of its offices had been closed and therefore its participation in the election had effectively been nullified. Now, government spokesmen had told us, stated to us that the real reason for the Democracy Party's withdrawal was that it realized that it did not have popular support and therefore would be discredited by the elections. We were, of course, not able to verify either of these hypotheses. We simply present them for your consideration.

Now, amid these events, the chief of staff of the Turkish Army, General Gures, made a public statement reported in the press and not denied by anyone, by him or anyone else. The following were his words. "There is no need to look for the bandits in the mountains. Unfortunately, some of them are under the roof of the Parliament. The bandits are in the Parliament itself."

Now, this was a clear accusation against the Kurdish deputies, against the Democracy Party deputies and an incitement to the Parliament to act against them and that is exactly, of course, what happened.

So, it was very difficult for us to escape the impression that the lifting of immunity of the Kurdish deputies was politically motivated and was a direct result of public frustration, political frustration, a combination of circumstances that I have mentioned earlier, and perhaps even a direct reaction to the Turkish Army Chief of Staff's incitation.

I would just like then to mention two more things. One is the Turkish policy toward the Kurdish minority. As is well know, the traditional Turkish policy toward the Kurds of Turkey has been one of denial, denial that Kurds existed in Turkey, denial that Kurds were a separate group of any sort, determining the mountain Turks who have colorful customs and a little local language but who were Turks nonetheless. This denial began really at the outset of the Turkish Republic and lasted until the end of the last decade, by which time it really had no longer become sustainable.

At the beginning of the current decade, things began to change and this change was welcomed in the United States, in Western Europe and democratic nations everywhere, I think. President Ozal expressed the change and then he called for Turkish recognition of its Kurdish reality.

Our concern over the arrest, the lifting of immunity and arrest of the deputies is that this particular act signals a reversal of the Turkish policy of recognition of Turkey's Kurdish reality, that it signals a return to the earlier policy of denial. Now, among the Turkish officials we spoke with, there's some very clear evidence that this attitude of denial continues to exist. We were told, on the one hand, that Turkey has no Kurdish problem and, in the same breath almost, that it was necessary to act against the deputies because the Turkish public is tired of seeing its sons sent off to the southeast and come back in boxes.

So, on the one hand, there is no Kurdish problem and on the other hand there is a very serious Kurdish problem, obviously if the situation is as

portrayed. One of the very well placed foreign observers, knowledgeable foreign observers that we met with termed the insurgency in Southeastern Turkey "Turkey's Vietnam," or something very like it. We, of course, were not able to verify any of this. We were in Ankara. Our mission was a legal mission, but all of these things have an implication for the legal mission.

The other thing I would like to mention is a man named Mehdi Zana who we met during our brief stay in Ankara. We met him several times. We learned that he is the husband of Leyla Zana, one of the Kurdish deputies who was elected in 1991 whose immunity was lifted on March 2 and who is now in prison. We learned that he spent three years in prison in the early 1970s for pro-Kurdish activities, political activities, that in 1977 he was elected mayor of Diyarbakir and in 1980 he was arrested by the military government and held in prison for 11 years.

Now, Mehdi Zana gave us copies of the book that he had written in Turkish, published in Turkey, published in Istanbul, about his ll year imprisonment.

Obviously we weren't -- since none of speaks or reads

Turkish, we weren't able to read it, but we learned a bit about the book and I was impressed that here this man who had spent 11 years in jail was able to come out and write about this experience and have his book published. He said it had sold 6,000 copies, which we understood was doing quite well on the Turkish publications market.

So, I was impressed by this. I was shocked this morning to learn that Mehdi Zana was on Friday convicted and sentenced to four years in prison for evidently, so far as we know at this moment — I do not have the details, I do not have all the confirmation, but for a speech that he made in December 1992 to the European Parliament. I have a copy of this speech. It doesn't anywhere say that the Kurdish region should be independent of Turkey. It protests against acts of discrimination and political repression. It does not advocate separatism.

Now, Mehdi Zana's conviction and sentencing to four years in prison on a crime of speech, if this is exactly what it was, directly contradicts the assurance that was given us this morning by none other than the

Ambassador of Turkey, who assured us that there is no such thing as speech crime in Turkey, that people are entitled and have a right to express their political opinions freely in Turkey. If that is so, then I would like to ask how is it that Mehdi Zana could have been convicted and sentenced to four years for a speech.

Thank you.

Ms. Hafner. Thank you both very much.

I think it would be very helpful before we open this up to the audience if perhaps, Steve, you could give us a few more details about the legal basis for abolishing -- the court proceedings, for abolishing the Democratic Party.

Mr. Schneebaum. There is a provision of the constitution, and if you give me a moment I will find it and read it. Here it is. It's Article 69 of the Constitution which says — after setting out what you must do to organize a political party under Turkish law, it says, "Political parties shall not engage in activities outside the lines of their statutes and programs and shall not contravene the restrictions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution. Those that

contravene them shall be dissolved permanently."

So you refer then to Article 14 and see what it is that political parties are not permitted to do. Article 14 reads as follows, "None of the rights and freedom embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish state and republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the state under the control of an individual or a group of people or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas."

So, the idea is then that a political grouping, a political party, certified as a party under the political parties law, that as a matter of policy violates Article 14, loses its right to be so organized. So, ultimately the question with respect to the party is, we submit, the same as the question with respect to the individual deputies, have they acted in a way so as

to engender separatism in a way that comes outside the provisions here?

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Now, given that the idea of cultural autonomy or regional autonomy or whatever is an idea well understood in democracies around the world, it seems hard to believe that advocating something like that or privileged status or a particular ethnic minority could constitute an act so serious as to forfeit political party status. In any event, that is the petition, the petition before the constitutional court, not the state security court. The petition before the constitutional court is that the party has violated that provision and we are told that in the event that that action is successful, the members of the DEP, current members of in prison will lose the DEP who not their parliamentary immunity, not only as to a specific group of stated charges, but in general because once the party is abolished they are no longer members of Parliament. Once they're not members of Parliament, they can be prosecuted for anything they might have said or done irrespective of whether there has been a specific vote in Parliament to lift their immunity.

There is some precedent in Turkey for this. In fact, recent percent, that DEP's predecessor, which was the first institutionally Kurdish party that went by the acronym HEP, the HEP was abolished, was dissolved by the Supreme Court on similar grounds. There seems to be now a move afoot for the members of the DEP to reconstitute themselves as yet another Kurdish-based political party. So, you can imagine the sort of point counterpoint going on. The members of Parliament or the politicians organized themselves according to a set charter. That charter -- if someone moves against that charter to have it set aside illegal. as they reconstitute themselves under the same charter but a different name and this goes on and on and on. But there's every indication that that will happen again.

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There is, however, a provision of the Turkish constitution that calls for the dissolution of Parliament in the event that too many members lose their seats. There was quite a hot debate while we were there as to whether the abolition of the DEP with the resulting disenfranchisement of the DEP deputies would require dissolution of Parliament. That's a result that

nobody seems to want. Whether that will actually happen, I'm not prepared to express a conclusion. I simply don't know.

Ms. Hafner. Do you know how the dissolution of Parliament would occur procedurally? Is there a certain number of parliamentarians that would have to lose their seats?

Mr. Schneebaum. Yes., there is. Why don't I take a look at this while you're asking --

Ms. Hafner. Fine.

I would just add before we do go to the audience that Turkey is a very serious member and participant of the CSCE process. And, in fact, has probably been a leader in a number of areas at many of these CSCE meetings. I would also add to what Steve had said earlier regarding the violation of international agreements and also international law that not just the Helsinki Final Act but a rather extensive document adopted at Copenhagen in 1990 sets forth explicitly freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association. It has extensive language to which Turkey agreed regarding the formation of political parties as

36 1 one of the best ways of promoting pluralism in a 2 democratic society, and also has extensive language on 3 the protection of the basis for government, one of which 4 is the protection of its minorities. 5 I only point that out in terms of both that 6 these are -- again, although not international law, 7 these are agreements to which Turkey has committed 8 itself to and a process to which Turkey has committed

itself but is also a very serious player.

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Mr. Schneebaum. I found the provision. It is Article 78 of the Constitution which says that in cases where the number of vacant seats reaches five percent of the total number of seats, the total number of seats being 450, bi-elections shall be held within three Now, it's not clear whether that means bielections for those vacant seats or whether we're talking about a dissolution. It's simply not clear.

Ms. Hafner. You wouldn't reach that threshold anyway, would you?

Mr. Schneebaum. Not with the elimination of these members. However, there is a natural attrition Again, this is not clear as to whether they process.

37 1 all get lumped together. There's been one death, for 2 example, a yet unsolved murder of a former DEP deputy, 3 and others who have departed from Parliament for one reason or another. If that total number reaches five 5 percent, it's not clear what happens. 6 Ms. Hafner. I would like to open this up for 7 discussion. I would ask that you please approach -- we 8 have several microphones. If you would come up, please 9

give us your name and if you're with an organization because this briefing is on the record and there will be transcripts made and a publication made which will be available to the public.

Yes, sir?

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Suyari. Sabri Suyari, Institute of Turkish Studies, George Washington University.

I appreciate your efforts to take the time and energy and so forth to go to Turkey to look into the human rights issues. I have one or two questions.

One, in your presentations, I have not heard the word "the Parliament," emphasized very often. heard the government or the prosecutor and things like that. As you well know, this was a vote that was passed

Parliament. According bv the to the Turkish Constitution, this is the way a deputy's political immunity is removed. So, we're not looking at a one party system, we're looking at a democratic form of government in which the Parliament exercises this Interestingly enough, one-fifth of that authority. Parliament, of that 450 members are of Kurdish origin. So, you're looking at a decision in which there was a significant Kurdish input. The way in which the Turkish Parliament deals with this issue is very similar to other European democracies. Belgium, Iceland are the two countries that come to my mind.

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The second point that I'd like to raise is that there is no Golden Rule in democracies, as you well pointed out, that you cannot ban political parties or you cannot lift the immunities of deputies. What pluralist democracies say is that they will tolerate significant political oppositions that are loyal to the constitutional order of that state. As somebody who teaches a graduate seminar at GW on Western European politics, I can recite you numerous examples in which Western European democracies have banned parties, have

lifted the immunities of deputies.

For example, in Germany in 1956, the German Constitutional Court banned the Communist Party for undermining the basic fundamentals of German state and society, at a time when Communist Parties were free in Italy and France, by the way.

In 1983, the Italian Parliament removed the political immunity of Professor Tony Negre who was elected to the Parliament from the Radical Party for being "the theoretician," not the practitioner, the theoretician of the Red Brigades. He was up for arrest but went out of the country in time to escape and find refuge in France.

So, democracies have to protect themselves against extremist forces, against forces which do not recognize their legitimacy. If you'll look at the actions of DEP, ranging from the statements of its leader to the way in which its party congresses have turned into PKK meetings, to the way in which its representatives speak in Europe and so forth, and I can go into details on this, I don't want to take too much time, you can see that there is a very serious question

as to whether or not at this point they are to be considered loyal opposition or disloyal opposition to the state.

In political science, I don't know about the legal profession, but we have continuous debates as to what constitutes a loyal and what constitutes a disloyal opposition. So, I'd like you if you can address those issues.

Ms. Hafner. Thank you very much.

Mr. Schneebaum. Well, I greet my faculty colleague from George Washington University where I teach European law, as a matter of fact, as an adjunct.

As to the first point, it is of course the Parliament that voted to lift the immunity of the deputies. But as I tried to be careful to point out, it is not the immunity of the deputies that really is at issue. What is at issue is what they are charged with. What is the crime that they allegedly committed? The vote in Parliament was analogized to us repeatedly as like a grand jury vote, like an indictment. That is, the Parliament was not asked whether these people were guilty, it was asked only whether there was sufficient

evidence to justify going forward with the trial. So, yes, there was a public vote. However, the government coalition obviously has "the votes" or it wouldn't be the government coalition, and voted to remove the immunity. That again is not the issue that we point to as inconsistent with Turkey's international law commitments.

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As to the second point, I think the only one of the analogies that you cite that is on point is the Negre one. With respect to Negre, as I understand it at least, the allegation was that there was evidence directly connecting this man to specific acts of violence. While here, the allegations are simply not of that nature. Again, there may be -- we constantly heard that it doesn't matter so much whether in this speech or that speech words were spoken to incite violence. matters is that everyone knows that the DEP is the political arm of the PKK and everyone knows therefore that DEP deputies are implicated in PKK violence. That's not the Negre case and that, was submit, is no more consistent with international law as it would have been consistent to prosecute any member of, say, the

Communist or for that matter even the Socialist Party in Italy in the early 1980s because some words that he spoke might have been interpreted in a certain way.

Ambassador Korn. I would like also just to address briefly this concept of loyal versus disloyal opposition, which strikes me as being an extremely dangerous one if accepted as valid. Anyone can be termed disloyal opposition at any time. How can you have a state of law with a concept of that type?

Ms. Hafner. Doctor Karim?

Doctor Karim. I'm with Kurdish National Congress. By the way, I am also affiliated with George Washington University. So, it looks like we're taking turns.

what I'd really like to -- mine is more of a statement than a question, but you can comment on it. That is I think Ambassador Korn accurately pointed out that the Turkish Constitution from the beginning has been one of denial for the Kurds. So, the DEP deputies, in some of their statements that they have been accused of separatism or trying to change the status quo, have asked for legal ways through the Parliament to change

this constitution. The Turkish Constitution at present 1 2 does not recognize anything that's Kurdish, whether it's 3 Kurdish Party, Kurdish language. Nothing Kurdish is 4 recognized in the Constitution. 5 It's similar to the apartheid laws. There 6 were blacks who were put in some places and they could 7 have their rights as long as they were within those 8 boundaries, but the Kurds don't even have that. They created -- if most of the Kurds in the Parliament act 9 10 like Buthelezi did in South Africa, they will be immune. 11 They can say things and that's fine. But if you talk 12 like Nelson Mandela or African National Congress, then 13 you are a terrorist, you are a separatist. 14 So, the problem in Turkey is the Constitution 15 is against the Kurdish and apartheid constitution very 16 similar to it. As long as that continues, there will be 17 PKK, there will be fighting. The present situation will 18 continue, and I don't think we will see an end to it. 19 Thank you. 20 Ms. Hafner. Would anyone care to comment or 21 does everyone agree?

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Schneebaum.

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expertise, such as it is.

Ms. Hafner. Ambassador Korn?

Mrs. Porter?

Mrs. Porter. Thank you. My name is Catherine Cameron Porter and I'm here to make a statement. I'd like to comment on a recent trip in which I visited the Southeast of Turkey and which I culminated by having dinner in Ankara with these two gentlemen who very ably represented us there, and at which dinner we had with Mr. Zana, who has now been arrested and is in poor health as I understand it.

I might preface this by saying that my husband is a member of the CSCE and that the Congressional Human Rights Caucus was a caucus formed after John and I traveled to the Soviet Union in 1982. I have long been involved in human rights things and I have to say from the bottom of my heart that the experience that I had in Diyarbakir and the environs around Diyarbakir were the most horrific, the most difficult from a personal and from a morale and ethical standpoint that I have ever encountered.

I really don't know where to begin, but I do

know that I want to bring you the voices of the Kurdish people that I talked to. I think that I'm one of a very few number of Americans who have actually been able to be on the ground there in the Southeast and to be there and talk with Kurdish people without having an informer from the Governor's Office traveling with me. In fact, we went to a great deal of trouble to set up meetings with the local people and specifically women and teachers who seemed to be the target of the -- and I have to use this term -- the police state that exists in Turkey today.

that exists there and I think that our benign neglect as a country is really allowing people to die in increasing numbers everyday. I believe the people that helped me while I was in Turkey are at great risk. Two of them are missing since then. On my first evening there, prior to a meeting that was to take place at 11:00 the next day, the Super Governor who is appointed, is not an elected position, called my hotel and informed me that I had a meeting with him at 10:00. I have to believe it was as a direct result of this informal meeting, this

discussion group to take place. So, obviously, I did meet with the Super Governor who tried to — who was very cordial and gracious, but at the same time tried to orchestrate my movements. You cannot move outside of Diyarbakir for more than a few miles at a time without a police or military intervention and you must have his blessing in order to travel. However, I did visit burned out villages.

What I neglected to say was that that second day, at 4:00 in the afternoon, one of the persons I would have met with if I hadn't been with the governor, was killed in the market, executed, shot in the back of the head. The day after that, an eight year old boy, an eight year old boy, was shot in his father's butcher market. This was another case of a person who was going to be at that meeting, that 10:00 meeting. A woman, a teacher, has disappeared. We still don't know her status. The last day I was there, another person disappeared again.

People are being denied due process of law.

People are being picked up for smoking a Kurdish brand of cigarette because it is a brand of cigarettes that

the PKK has advocated. People are being brought in to be questioned and never heard of again. They're being asked to sign statements after torture, after watching their daughters, their mothers, their wives being tortured in front of them.

I was followed repeatedly, I was harassed at my hotel to the point of having someone peeking through the ventilation duct watching me take a shower. I have never encountered such outright abuses of human rights that are set upon and are being visited upon the Kurdish population, in large part because the United States doesn't have the courage to look at our policy there. It's time to stop talking about the status quo in terms of strategic interest. It's time for the United States to press Turkey to talk to the guerrillas that exist and to realize that the PKK has a wide acceptance amongst the people there because they have no alternative.

Our insistence upon propping up the Turkish government because of our need to maintain strategic interest is really driving people toward fundamentalist movement within Turkey. It's time for us to look at the real strategic interest.

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1	I'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank
2	you.
3	Ms. Hafner. Thank you, Mrs. Porter.
4	Mr. Tan?
5	Mr. Tan. Well, thank you very much. I am
6	from the Turkish Embassy. My name is Namik Tan.
7	I think you should have been very much
8	impressed by Mrs. Porter's remarks about Turkey. I
9	think before you consider all those imaginary
10	statements, I should say, I should refresh your
11	memories, especially Mrs. Porter's.
12	Some years ago, she was in South Cyprus in
13	front of a group of just trying to protest Turkey's
14	invasion of so-called invasion of North Cyprus. So,
15	the aim to go to Southeast Turkey by the way, it is
16	by the help of the Turkish government. I should add
17	that. Is not to just relay a brief an objective
18	account of the serious events going on over there, but
19	just to abuse and exploit your feelings over here.
20	Having said that, I have a few questions to
21	our testifiers.

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One of them regarding Mr. Ambassador's

references to Gures, the Chief of Turkish general staff. He referred to him saying that the bandits are in the Parliament, but not on the mountains. He said that these are clear indications of inciting the state authorities to prosecute those people, DEP members.

In fact, Gures, according to what you have said about the indictments toward the DEP members, the arrest of DEP members, has just done what you say a speech act, nothing more than that. He said his views. So, how do you simply just indicted him, convicted him to inciting such kind of behavior from the state authorities? But on the other hand, you are saying that the DEP members have done nothing but just expressing their views. This is my first question.

The second question is about the so-called dissolution or dissolving the DEP prospective, dissolution as you term it. You said all those members will be losing their membership of the Parliament. As a government official, I have had no idea about this legal mechanism because all the members of DEP were former HEP members. When HEP was dissolved, none of them has lost their membership. So, why is that this

1 time when DEP dissolves and all those members lose their 2 membership? That's my second question. 3 Thank you. 4 Ms. Hafner. Thank you very much. 5 Ambassador Korn? 6 Ambassador Korn. Well, first of all, I want 7 to say that all of us in the delegation appreciated the 8 assistance that First Secretary Tan gave in 9 organizing this visit. So, I want that to be clear. 10 On the matter of General Gures, he was, I suppose one could say, exercising his right of free 11 12 speech and he was not prosecuted for it. However, I 13 think it must be clear that someone in a position of 14 this sort has more than simply a right of free speech, 15 has a responsibility and one could imagine what would happen if the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces 16 17 got up and said, "In the Congress there are subversives. 18 Action must be taken against them." 19 I don't think that it is simply -- it's 20 tenable to say that a statement of this sort did not

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influence or could not have been intended to influence

the actions of the Turkish Parliament.

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Ms. Hafner. Actually, we do know what would happen. We have our history to look at and that was when a senator said there are subversives in this country. So, we do know what it does to a democracy and, in fact, what the consequences can be.

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Mr. Schneebaum. Let me add -- before addressing the second point, which is an easy one, let me add to the former one. If there were an issue of General Gures being criminally prosecuted, if he were currently behind bars, not only behind bars for his speech but denied, for example, the opportunity to be visited by international observers who visit Turkey for the purpose of checking up on him, simply because of the statement that he made, I think that I at least, and I suspect I may speak for Ambassador Korn as well, would be willing to say that that was inconsistent with Turkey's obligations under its international commitments.

With respect to the second question Mr. Tan asked, the answer to that can be found in the third paragraph of Article 84 of the Turkish Constitution, which says, and I quote, "The membership of deputies who

1 belonged to a party on the date when an action for 2 dissolution of that party was brought shall end on the 3 date when the presidency of the Turkish Grand National 4 Assembly is notified of the dissolution order." There's 5 no question about this. It's right there in the Turkish 6 Constitution. The reason that the deputies who were 7 members of the HEP did not lose their seats was that 8 they resigned from the HEP before the dissolution order 9 was presented. Several members, I think it's two, I'm 10 not certain, resigned from the DEP in advance of this 11 dissolution order. They will not lose their seats. 12 However, the other 13, that is the six who are in prison 13 plus the seven who are not, will, under Article 84, lose 14 their membership. It's a simple matter of what the 15 constitution says. 16 Ambassador Korn. There were four of them who 17 resigned. 18 Four who resigned? Okay. Mr. Schneebaum. 19 Mr. Xulam. My name is Kani Xulam. I am from 20 American Kurdish Information Network. 21 I was glad that the delegation was met in

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Ankara well and it was received well. Had they gone to

the Southeast, I'm sure they would have had the same fate of Mrs. Porter. Indeed, people that they would meet would have been slaughtered and they would have had the same experience.

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In Ankara, in the Turkish Daily News that they were able to follow, the facade is a beautiful one. Probably on the face of it one might think that it's truly democratic. But behind the scenes in the Southeast, where the real war is waged on the Kurds, it's a different story. In Turkey there is a democratic struggle on the part of the Kurds to validate their aspirations of living in the 20th Century with decency, with dignity. Then there's the arms struggle.

In the Southeast the issue hasn't come up so far is the Turkish Human Rights Association in last year's report noted that 874 Kurdish villages were destroyed. This, I think, should be clear and it should be noted here. Nineteen Kurdish towns have been bombed without a declaration of war. More than 1,000 Kurdish activists who have simply said that we want political change through dialogue have been killed by the death squads, the so-called unidentified murderers. 24,000

political prisoners are in jail because they think differently as this democracy, because they think differently because they're Kurds. That's the only fault of theirs and they're behind bars.

Amnesty has reported that 15 people have disappeared this year alone and Serif Ausar, the brother of Behcet Ausar, the spokesperson for the Ozgur Gundum in Rurope, was taken away about a week ago and three or four days ago was found with two bullet holes in his head. This also should be brought up and this also should be clear.

The challenge is really to validate the democratic forces in Turkey. This is, I believe, the challenge of this country. Had Democracy Party been allowed to vote in the Southeast, had been allowed to participate in the election, the fundamentalist rise would not have taken place, it's my opinion, and the problem that we face today, the deterioration of the conditions, would not have gone from bad to worse.

Thank you.

Ms. Hafner. Thank you very much, Kani.

Do we have anymore questions from the

audience?

Before closing, I would just like to add to what Ambassador Korn said earlier. That is regarding Mehdi Zana. We view this as a very serious concern on the part of the Commission and I will tell you that the Chairman, Senator DeConcini and Congressman Hoyer have, in fact, cabled the prime minister and protested this action. I would like to read to you a statement by Mr. DeConcini and Mr. Hoyer.

"The increasingly frequent practice to arrest those who speak out peacefully for Kurdish rights is an affront to democracy and violates international human rights commitments undertaken by the government of Turkey. Having met with Mehdi Zana, we know him to be a man of honor and peaceful intentions. Although he has never participated in or even advocated acts of violence, he has already spent over 15 years in prison and has been subjected to torture. This latest sentence is further indication that democracy in Turkey is becoming increasingly fragile."

That was a statement issued by Mr. DeConcini and Mr. Hoyer today.

I would like to thank both of our panelists for joining the Commission. I think perhaps that a further understanding of the legal grounds upon which governments act against their citizens is critical in analyzing any government or any society that puts forward the view that, in fact, it is a society based on rule of law, which I believe Turkey, in fact, aspires to be. Thank you very much. (Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

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